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A B S T R A C T   
By the end of 2017, China formally established the national carbon trading market, however, only electricity 
industry was eligible to participate in the emission trading scheme (ETS). This paper aims to answer the question 
as to what should China do after the first step of establishing China’s national ETS market using a dynamic 
recursive CGE model with six scenarios from different coverage according to relevant documents. The results 
show that when more industries are covered in ETS market it will lead to a higher GDP performance and less ETS 
price in general. Since the trading price is related to the marginal emission reduction cost of enterprises, the 
coverage of enterprises with low emission reduction cost can bring lower prices. However, there is no direct 
relationship between carbon price and emission reduction, as the coverage is different in different. There is no 
obvious relationship between the additional burden of enterprises and emission reduction, it is only related to 
carbon price and the coverage. Finally, we find that after covering the power generation industry, the carbon 
market should cover other primary energy production enterprises, which will bring much better emission 
reduction benefits than the original plan of the National Development and Reform Commission in China.   
1. Introduction 
The climate change caused by Greenhouse gases has become a major 
issue that the world needs to solve (Zhang et al., 2019). As the largest 
emitter country, China participates in global efforts actively to curb 
global warming. After the 11th Five-Year Plan, China has introduced a 
number of policy plans intensively to form a policy system for 
low-carbon and green development. In the 12th Five-Year Plan, China 
proposed that the nation’s Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) market 
should be established gradually, as its ability to cope with climate 
change only relies on market forces rather than administrative 
measures. 
Many experts have been contributing a lot to cope with the problems 
of CO2 reduction or energy saving (Lin and Jia, 2019a). Sustainable 
development and ECO development have become hot topics nowadays 
(Moran et al., 2008; van Weenen, 1995). Low-carbon economy and low 
carbon policy are currently the mainstream of coupling with environ-
mental change and many mitigation tools have been studied or imple-
mented such as carbon tax (Caron et al., 2018; Macaluso et al., 2018), 
carbon sinks (Bastviken et al., 2011; Ritter et al., 2017) and ETS 
(Babatunde et al., 2017; Li and Jia, 2016; Liu et al., 2015; Tol, 2018). 
Today, there are many emission trading markets in the world, such as 
EU-ETS (Verde et al., 2019), RGGI (Fell and Maniloff, 2018), CCX (Gans 
and Hintermann, 2013), NSW-GAAS (Passey et al., 2008) and China’s 
pilot and national ETS (Lin and Jia, 2019b; Liu and Fan, 2018; Tan and 
Wang, 2017). Studies that focused on ETS can be classified into three 
aspects: 1) the introduction and prediction of ETS, 2) the impact or 
evaluation of ETS and 3) design or construction of ETS, or behaviors 
under ETS. 
For the first aspect, Oh et al. (2017) depicted different design 
backgrounds of ETS characteristics in developing and emerging coun-
tries, as well as a case study in Korea. Zhu et al. (2017a) used two 
methods to predict carbon prices: decomposition of empirical mode and 
vector regression of evolutionary least-squares support. Khaqqi et al. 
(2018) proposed a novel ETS mechanism integrating the consideration 
for Industry 4.0, and depicted that the mechanism of ETS may be a better 
scheme and that the value of benefits is greater than the value of its 
drawback as its implementation. Zhu et al. (2017b) studied on China’s 
abatement potential of the iron industry and steel industry by using 
quantitative assessment in the ETS market and they argued that the CO2 
reduction potential might be underestimated. Xia and Tang (2017) 
estimated interregional embodied emissions and derived cost curves for 
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regional marginal abatement by proposing a multi-region input-output 
model. Chang et al. (2018) analyzed dynamic relationship between 
energy prices and ETS prices and found that the obstacles between them 
are controlled energy pricing and overreaction of ETS market. Rose et al. 
(2018) predicted that additional 0.2–0.4% cost of GDP will be burdened 
as UK is leaving EU-ETS if they want to achieve the reduction target. 
For the second aspect, Wu et al. (2017) evaluated the economic ef-
fects of policies of ETS and renewable energy generation. Dai et al. 
(2018) conducted a similar study on the same topic but considered 
China’s reduction target. Cao et al. (2018) investigated the influences of 
ETS and several subsidy policy on production industries as well as CO2 
reduction level of a manufacturer, they explored which option of these 
policies is better for society, and found that carbon emission reduction 
level will increase with the ETS price increase, whereas it will be hardly 
changed with the variations of low-carbon subsidies. Ju and Fujikawa 
(2019) analyzed the cost transmission mechanism in China’s ETS market 
and found most sectors would not suffer a great increase, which results 
are similar to some of relevant literatures Lin and Jia, 2018. 
For the third aspect, Lin et al. (2016) showed that adjustable 
feed-in-tariffs are based on the evolution of emission trading prices in 
order to propose China’s climate policy package with the consideration 
of cost-effectiveness by presenting a simple method. Mehling and Haites 
(2009) analyzed the possibility of linking the ETS markets, and proposed 
that most obstacles are recognition of allocating emission allowance and 
certified emission reductions. Liu et al. (2017) studied the efforts of 
enterprises in EU-ETS to maximize profit and minimize cost during the 
allowances trading in Phrase II. Wadud and Chintakayala (2019) 
brought some thoughts to us about the trade-off between in-home and 
transport in personal carbon trading and indicated it is difficult to 
reduce emissions at personal level. Eikeland and Skjærseth (2019) 
analyzed the reaction of oil and electricity industries and found that 
responses of the electricity industry are more positive than that of the 
petroleum industry. Cludius et al. (2019) evaluated cost-efficiency of 
EU-ETS in period II and uniformly supported the theoretical 
cost-efficiency of EU-ETS. 
The National carbon trading market in China officially started on 
December 19, 2017 and China’s government proposed National carbon 
emission trading market construction plan (power generation industry), 
which is the first official document of China’s national ETS (National 
Development and Reform Commission, 2017). It can be confirmed that 
China’s carbon trading system has officially started although only the 
power industry is involved. Therefore, studies about which industries 
are suitable aside the electricity sectors to participate in the carbon 
trading system becomes very meaningful. 
The research on sectoral coverage has been studied by many scholars 
(Pang et al., 2018; Qi and Cheng, 2018). Dijkstra et al. (2011) found the 
positive impact of extending the sectoral coverage of an international 
ETS. Lin and Jia (2017) suggested the patterns of phase I and II of 
EU-ETS. Qian et al. (2018) believed that covering industries with high 
emissions and high energy intensity can lead to the highest emission 
reduction effects and will also moderate economic and welfare losses. 
Most literature argues that more coverage will result in greater reduc-
tion and lower reduction cost (Mu et al., 2018). Other literature holds 
different opinions, such as Wang et al. (2018) found no inherent rela-
tionship between the market structure and the efficient coverage of the 
allowance market. However, based on the study, we believe that the 
coverage with only energy production enterprises may be better than 
those with energy intensity, providing new ideas for ETs policies. Little 
research have focused on the real event of China’s ETS market. The 
research on this topic is almost blank. Therefore, this paper aims to 
answer the question as to which industries are suitable to follow elec-
tricity sectors into the carbon trading system. We hope this paper can 
play a certain reference role for China’s policy makers, as well as policy 
makers in other ETS market, in selection of better industries to partici-
pate in future ETS markets. The innovations and contributions of this 
paper are as follows:  
1) Based on the current policy of China’s pilot ETS market, this paper 
discusses the potential options of sectoral coverage in China’s na-
tional ETS market in the future. The conclusions of this paper will 
serve as a reference for policy makers. As almost no paper considers 
the construction of the carbon market from this perspective, thus this 
paper will fill the knowledge gap.  
2) This paper constructs a dynamic recursive CGE model to study the 
effect of ETS coverage options and it also explains how to convert 
CGE model from static to dynamic, which will serve as a reference for 
CGE modelers on how to set up a CGE model with carbon emission 
trading block.  
3) This paper draws relatively new conclusions: we found it is better to 
cover energy production industries into ETS market rather than en-
ergy intensive industries. The corresponding analyses and explana-
tions are given in section 5 and section 6. 
This paper is organized as follows: section 1 introduces the back-
ground and literature review of ETS. In section 2, status of China’s 
carbon market is presented. The methodology is provided in section 3. 
Section 4 shows the data source and describes scenario design. The 
research results and discussions are provided in section 5. The conclu-
sions, policy implications and limitations are proposed in section 6. 
2. China’s carbon market 
At the end of October 2011, the National Development and Reform 
Commission in China approved five pilot cities and two provinces 
(Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Hubei, Guangdong, and 
Shenzhen) to conduct carbon emissions trading pilot, and later in 2017, 
Fujian became the 8th pilot area. Since 2011, the pilot areas have carried 
out various basic tasks, including the formulation of local laws and 
regulations, the determination of total control objectives and coverage, 
the establishment of greenhouse gases measurement, reporting, and 
verification systems, the allocation of emission allowances, the estab-
lishment of trading systems, development of registration systems, 
establishment of special management agencies, establishing market su-
pervision systems, etc., and finally formed a comprehensive and com-
plete carbon trading system. 
The China-U.S. Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change issued 
on September 25th, 2015, indicated China’s plans to launch a nation-
wide carbon emission trading system in 2017 and coverage of key in-
dustries such as: electricity, chemicals, building materials, paper, non- 
ferrous metals, iron and steel (The Central People’s Government of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2015). 
National carbon emission trading market construction plan (power gen-
eration industry) was proposed on December 19, 2017 (National Devel-
opment and Reform Commission, 2017). The document revealed that 
only the power generation industry will participate in ETS market in the 
first step of ETS construction. However, more industries will be covered 
and according to the plan, the national ETS market will cover 340–400 
million tons of carbon dioxide emissions, which will make China’s car-
bon market the world’s largest carbon market, it may be twice as 
EU-ETS. Because of the huge reduction potential, the carbon market in 
China has a profound impact on the world’s road to emission reduction. 
Therefore, it is very meaningful to study the future trend of China’s 
carbon market. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. CGE model 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model is a model widely 
utilized for analyzing policies of energy and environment (Borgomeo 
et al., 2018; Dovì and Battaglini, 2015; Siagian et al., 2017). Different 
from input-output model (Chen et al., 2018; Cui et al., 2015) and 
econometric analysis (Tan et al., 2018b, Tan et al., 2018), CGE model 
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can analyze the impact of a target issue on the whole society better. 
Three characteristics of CGE model (He and Lin, 2017; Hosoe, 2018; Wu 
et al., 2014) are summarized below.  
1) The supply and demand function clearly reflect the behavior of 
producers pursuing profit maximization and consumers pursuing 
maximization of utility.  
2) The quantity and relative price are both endogenous in the model, 
and the resource allocation method is determined by the general 
equilibrium model structure with Walras’s law.  
3) The focus of this model is on simulating the physical aspect of the 
economic entity. The resources of the economy in the model have 
been fully utilized. 
The basic modelling structure is according to Lin and Jia (2019b), 
which consists of five blocks: production block, income-expenditure 
block, trade block, energy-policy block, and macroscopic-closure & 
market-clearing block. The CGE model will be introduce briefly. 
3.1.1. Production block 
The framework of the production block in the CGE model is depicted 
in Fig. 1. This block has four levels of nesting. Except for the output 
bundle in the top, most follow Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
production function. While output bundle consists of factor input and 
intermediate input following Leontief production function, like many 
other studies (Breisinger et al., 2019), as there are tremendous of in-
termediate inputs being considered in this bundle. The elasticity of 
production block is set in accordance with AIM/CGE2.0 (Fujimori et al., 
2012). 
Although most studies on CGE models separates oil and gas in-
dustries, the split method is quite crude: the difference of intermediate 
input is not considered and the dominated fossil energy is coal, this 
paper does not separate the two industries. 
3.1.2. Income-expenditure block 
The block expresses the behavior of the four factors: households, 
government, enterprises and the rest of the world. The trade deficit is 
given by exogenous, which is according to several relative guidebooks 
and literature (Hosoe, 2004; Hosoe et al., 2010). 
3.1.3. Trade block 
Armington commodities are introduced into this CGE model to 
simulate the integrated consumption of household, government and 
domestic enterprises (He et al., 2014; Lin and Li, 2012). By using CES 
function, we can differ domestic production-domestic consumption 
goods and import goods from domestic consumption (Armington con-
sumption). Using CET (Constant Elasticity of Transformation) functions, 
we can simulate enterprises’ distributions of production in domestic 
market and international market. 
3.1.4. Energy-policy block 
This block is the simulation of ETS market. The rate of free allowance 
(free distribution part of carbon allowance) will be 0.9 in the period 
2017–2030, which setting follows the patterns in Guangdong pilot1 in 
China as well as the period I in EU-ETS, as there is no relative detail 
description in National carbon emission trading market construction plan 
(power generation industry) (National Development and Reform Com-
mission, 2017), which is the first official document of China’s national 
ETS market. This paper assumes that carbon emission allowance is 
calculated by grand fathering methods. This block can be explained by 
the following three equations. 
EMi ¼EM COALi þ EM O Gi (1)  
PLCei ¼ ptðCAei   FAeiÞ þ pf ðEMei   CAeiÞ;EMei � CAei
PLCei ¼ ptðCRei   FAeiÞ;EMei < CAei
(2)  
fpr¼
X
ei
FAei
.X
ei
CAei (3)  
Where EMi represents the total emission of a sector. EM COALi and 
EM O Gi represents CO2 emissions by different fossil fuels in the sector i. 
PLCei depicts the policy cost (enterprise burden) in the sector ei. The 
subscript of ei represents the coverage industries under the ETS. pt is 
carbon price while the pf represents the fine for over-emission. CAei 
denotes carbon allowances of the sector ei. FAei represents the free part 
of the carbon allowance, while fpr shows the rate of free payment. 
3.2. Model dynamics 
This paper uses a recursive method to construct a dynamic CGE 
model that is static. Some key exogenous parameters are changed by the 
period of the year, such as factor endowment (labor and capital), and 
technical progress. Capital depreciation is determined by the capital 
stock of the current period and investment. The capital stock is endog-
enous except for the first period, while investment is endogenous. The 
capital depreciation rate is illustrated in Table 1 which is set according 
to Lou (2015). 
Labor endowment is exogenous and determined by National Popu-
lation Development Plan (2016–2030) (The Central People’s Government 
of the People’s Republic of China, 2017). Autonomous Energy Efficiency 
Improvement (AEEI) in the CGE model is considered in this study ac-
cording to the relevant literature (Lin and Jia, 2019) and Medium and 
Long-term Energy Saving Special Planning (National Development and 
Reform Commission, 2005). 
Fig. 1. The framework of production block in CGE model.  
Table 1 
Capital depreciation rate of each sector.a  
Sectors AGR COL O_G PAP CMT FER CMC 
the rate of 
depreciation 
0.05 0.062 0.065 0.055 0.055 0.056 0.055 
Sectors STL EQU ELC CST TRA OTH SER 
the rate of 
depreciation 
0.055 0.062 0.048 0.055 0.052 0.055 0.045  
a The abbreviation is explained in Table 2. 
1 Implementation Plan of Carbon Emission Allowance Allocation in Guang-
dong Province in 2018 http://zwgk.gd.gov.cn/006939756/201807/t2018072 
5_774704.html. 
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4. Data source and scenario design 
4.1. Data source and social accounting matrix 
China’s input-output table is used to construct social accounting 
matrix which is a basic data of CGE model (China Input-Output Asso-
ciation, 2015). For analyzing energy issues, an energy balanced table is 
constructed and the data of this table is obtained from China Statistical 
Yearbook (National Bureau of Statistics, 2015). Compared with Global 
Carbon Budget 2017 (Le Qu�er�e et al., 2017), we declare that the CO2 
emissions discussed is only from energy consumption, without Biolog-
ical breath, microbial decomposition, and carbon sinks and carbon 
emissions from land and sea. Sector classification is depicted in Table 2. 
4.2. Scenario design 
According to different documents in different periods, we propose 
five scenarios with different coverage industries. A BaU (Business as 
Usual) scenario and five countermeasure scenarios are constructed as 
shown in Table 3. The model is dynamic model over 2012–2030 year 
period. In addition, it is simulated that China started a nationwide 
carbon trading market since 2017. 
Following are the descriptions of scenario settings:  
1) BaU scenario. BaU scenario assumes that there is no ETS market in 
2017–2030.  
2) ELC scenario. ELC scenario assumes that only electricity industry is 
covered in ETS market in 2017–2030.  
3) ECC (electricity, chemical, and cement) scenario. In July 2017, the 
progress of measurement, reporting, and verification of CO2 emis-
sions in some provinces was severely delayed, and the quality of data 
was low. National Development and Reform Commission in China 
decided that the first batch of coverage industries should only be 
electricity, chemical, and cement, which have better databases.  
4) ENINT (energy-intensive) scenario. According to the plan proposed 
by China’s development and reform commission on January 2016, 
the first phase will cover key emission companies in the eight in-
dustries of petrochemicals, chemicals, building materials, steel, non- 
ferrous metals, paper, electricity, and transportation. This situation 
is simulated by the ENINT scenario that all of energy intensive in-
dustries are covered.  
5) ENPRO (energy production) scenario. In phase I of EU-ETS, energy 
production industries are covered in the market. We, therefore, 
simulate a condition that ETS only covers energy production in-
dustries in 2020–2030.  
6) EUETS-III scenario. In EUETS-III scenario, almost all of the energy 
and energy-intensive industries. It is set according to phase III of the 
EU-ETS, and the coverage is the same as coverage industries in 
ENINT scenario added the coverage in ENPRO scenario. 
5. Results and discussion 
5.1. The impact on economy 
5.1.1. GDP 
Fig. 2 illustrates GDP in all countermeasure scenarios compared with 
BaU scenario in 2030. The bars express the amount of GDP (left ordi-
nates) and the line expresses GDP loss rate compared with BaU scenario 
(right ordinates). If China does not establish ETS market, 2030 GDP will 
be 86.86 billion (price at 2012 level). However, the establishment will 
reduce China’s GDP directly to some extent. As Fig. 2 shows, GDP will be 
85.63, 85.65, 85.69, 85.54 and 85.71 trillion yuan, or suffer 1.44%, 
1.41% 1.36% 1.54% and 1.34% reduction in ELC, ECC, ENINT, ENPRO, 
and EUETS-III scenarios respectively. Moreover, GDP loss is somehow 
sensitive to the choice of coverage industries. The GDP loss will be 1.23, 
1.20, 1.17, 1.32 and 1.14 trillion yuan in ELC, ECC, ENINT, ENPRO, and 
EUETS-III scenarios, respectively. The largest decline in GDP will occur 
in ENPRO scenario. The next will be ELC and ECC scenarios. The results 
indicate that more coverage will lead to a higher GDP performance 
(however, the CO2 reduction capacity all also be different, which can be 
seen in section 5.3), moreover, it seems like that only covering energy 
production industries into ETS market will result in more GDP loss. The 
reason why different scenarios have different GDP performances could 
refer to the discussion in section 5.1.3 (commodity prices and domestic 
output). 
5.1.2. International trade 
The changes in exports in countermeasure scenarios compared with 
BaU scenario in 2030 are illustrated in Fig. 3. Exports in energy pro-
duction industries will decrease sharply: the export of coal, oil and gas, 
and electricity will reduce 30.63–43.90%, 18.21–27.85% and 
43.19–52.44% respectively. The industry that is not covered is less 
affected, by 0.47–7.24% reduction. Commodity exports are very sensi-
tive to the coverage of the industries. For instance, cement is covered in 
ECC, ENINT and EUETS-III scenarios and the reduction will be 
22.27–30.16%, while it will be 6.21–6.28% in ELC and ENPRO sce-
narios. Exports in all industries will decrease with a different range, 
which reason is simple: ETS makes the cost of coverage industries 
increasing, which will lead to the increase in the prices of commodities 
up as well as the output decrease so that the ability to export to the rest 
of world will decline, especially in energy production sectors. 
The changes in imports in countermeasure scenarios compared with 
BaU scenario in 2030 are depicted in Fig. 4. ETS impact on imports will 
not be obvious as that on export. Most of the commodity import changes 
are not more than positive and negative 8%, except for fossil energy 
production sectors, such as coal, oil and gas industries. The reason why 
ETS impact on import is not significant compared with that on export is 
that exports are mainly determined by domestic output, and imports are 
mainly determined by domestic consumption. Moreover, ETS will 
directly affect domestic output, rather than domestic consumption. 
5.1.3. Prices of goods and the domestic output 
Fig. 5 shows that the prices of goods in all industries compared with 
BaU scenario in 2030. The industrial coverage will significantly influ-
ence goods prices in these covered industries based on the findings. For 
instance, coal price will increase by 4.39–4.99% in scenarios in the ELC, 
ECC and ENINT scenarios. However, it will be 9.97–11.13% in ENPRO 
and EUETS-III scenarios, in which coal industry participates ETS market. 
The rule also applies to industries of cement, fertilizer, chemicals, steel 
etc. Also, the increase in electricity prices will reduce when more in-
dustries are covered by ETS markets. Its leading cause maybe that 
energy-intensive enterprises are under greater pressure to reduce CO2 
emissions than other enterprises, so the coverage of ETS will 
Table 2 
Description and coverage of sector classification and population classification.  
Sectors Description 
AGR Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery 
COL Coal mining and washing industry 
O_G Petroleum and natural gas exploitation 
PAP Paper industry 
CMT Cement 
FER Chemical fertilizer 
CMC Chemicals 
STL Steel smelting and rolling processing industry 
EQU Equipment manufacturing industry 
ELC Electricity 
CST Construction industry 
TRA Transportation 
OTH Other industry 
SER Service 
RUR Rural population 
CTZ Urban population  
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significantly increase ETS price (shown in section 5.2.1). Additionally, 
as more enterprises participate, the lower the carbon trading price, the 
lower the burden on electricity industry. Moreover, we find that only 
coal and electricity prices will increase more than 10% in ENPRO sce-
nario, indicating that the coverage of energy production sectors will 
directly affect the price increase in the energy production industry, and 
will indirectly drive CO2 reduction of other companies through price 
factors. 
Fig. 6 illustrates domestic output in all industries compared with BaU 
scenario in 2030. The changes in domestic output directly reflect the 
Table 3 
Scenario design of coverage industries.  
Scenario BaU ELC ECC ENINT ENPRO EUETS-III 
Period Ia IIb I II I II I II I II I II 
AGR – – – – – – – – – – – – 
COL – – – – – – – – – Cc – C 
O_G – – – – – – – – – C – C 
PAP – – – – – – – C – – – C 
CMT – – – – – C – C – – – C 
FER – – – – – – – – – – – – 
CMC – – – – – C – C – – – C 
STL – – – – – – – C – – – C 
EQU – – – – – – – – – – – – 
ELC – – C C C C C C C C C C 
CST – – – – – – – C – – – C 
TRA – – – – – – – C – – – C 
OTH – – – – – – – – – – – – 
SER – – – – – – – – – – – –  
a Period I refers to the initial period of carbon trading market. This paper sets the preriod as 2017–2020. 
b Period I refers to the developing period of carbon trading market. This paper sets the preriod as 2020–2030. 
c C indicates that the industries is covered in ETS market in special period. 
Fig. 2. GDP in all countermeasure scenarios compared with BaU scenario in 2030.  
Fig. 3. The changes of export in countermeasure scenarios compared with BaU scenario in 2030.  
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changes in GDP in section 5.1.1. Similar to the effect on ETS price, the 
coverage will significantly influence domestic output. The enterprises 
will reduce their output when they participate in the ETS market, 
especially in energy production sectors and some of energy intensive 
sectors like cement. The reason is simple: the coverage will directly 
affect commodity prices. Different coverage industries will bring 
different relative prices, and different relative prices will lead to 
different consumption choices of commodity market, ultimately 
bringing different output value of enterprises. The reduction of domestic 
output is similar to GDP loss, especially the reduction of other secondary 
industries and services (the two industries account for nearly half of the 
economic output). 
5.2. The impact on ETS market 
5.2.1. ETS price 
Fig. 7 shows the ETS price in all countermeasure scenarios in 2030. 
In 2030, ETS price will be 562.78, 516.90, 448.17, 483.93, and 365.28 
yuan/t-CO2 in ELC, ECC, ENINT, ENPRO, and EUETS-III scenarios, 
respectively. The highest ETS price is the price in ELC scenario. We also 
find that the more industries are covered, the less ETS price will be. For 
example, the coverage industries in ELC, ENINT, and ENPRO scenario 
are the electricity sector, energy intensive sectors, and energy produc-
tion sectors respectively, and the price in which will be 483.93–562.78 
yuan/t-CO2 while the price in EUETS-III which covered energy pro-
duction sectors and energy intensive sectors will be 365.28 yuan/t-CO2. 
Fig. 4. The changes of import in countermeasure scenarios compared with BaU scenario in 2030.  
Fig. 5. Prices of goods in all industries compared with BaU scenario in 2030.  
Fig. 6. Domestic output in all industries compared with BaU scenario in 2030.  
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We found that 1) as more industries are covered by the ETS market, the 
less ETS price; 2) ETS price will increase when energy intensity in-
dustries are covered. The reasons may be that energy-intensive com-
panies are under greater pressure to reduce their emissions so that the 
inclusion of carbon trading will significantly increase the marginal 
abatement costs of ETS market (ETS price). However, when other 
companies participate in the market, they will become suppliers of 
carbon emission allowances for high-carbon ETS prices, which will 
reduce the abatement costs of the entire trading market to some extent. 
5.2.2. Total enterprises burden 
Total enterprise burden in ETS market in all countermeasure sce-
narios is depicted in Fig. 8. Enterprises’ burdens are additional costs of 
enterprises caused by establishing ETS market, which is an indicator to 
measure the pressure on enterprises due to the existence of ETS. The 
highest enterprise burden scenario is ENINT scenario, where enterprises 
burden will be 1.20 trillion yuan. The next is EUETS-III and ECC sce-
narios by 1.13 and 1.04 trillion yuan. The burden of the enterprises is 
relatively lower in ELC and ENPRO scenarios than other scenarios by 
0.92 and 0.94 trillion yuan. Although ETS price in ELC scenario is 
highest, the coverage industries are much less than others, so total en-
terprise burden is not as large as others, as well as that in ENPRO sce-
nario. We found that if ETS only covers energy-intensive industries, the 
total enterprise burden will be higher than that in scenarios with other 
coverage choice. 
The percentage of the enterprise burdens in different industries ac-
counts for total enterprise burden in 2030 countermeasure scenarios as 
shown in Table 4. The enterprises‘ burden in electricity industries will be 
915.17, 856.44, 769.59, 770.94, and 632.17 billion yuan in ELC, ECC, 
ENINT, ENPRO and EUETS-III scenarios respectively. We find that with 
the increase in the coverage industry, the pressure on the electricity 
industry will gradually decrease. Similarly, the more industries covered, 
the less the pressure of CO2 reduction in each coverage industry. 
5.3. The impact on CO2 reduction 
5.3.1. CO2 abatement 
Fig. 9 illustrates CO2 reduction capacity of ETS market in all coun-
termeasure scenarios from 2021 to 2030. The reduction capacity is 
calculated by comparing CO2 emissions in countermeasure scenarios 
with that in BaU scenario. CO2 emissions reduction effect will increase 
over time from 1.29 to 1.33 billion tons of CO2 (Bt-CO2) in 2021 to 
Fig. 7. Carbon price in all countermeasure scenarios in 2030.  
Fig. 8. Total enterprises burden in ETS market in all countermeasure scenarios.  
Table 4 
Enterprises burden of enterprises in ETS market in all countermeasure scenarios 
(unit: billion yuan).a  
Enterprises ELC ECC ENINT ENPRO EUETS-III 
COL 0.00 0.00 0.00 138.94 115.02 
O_G 0.00 0.00 0.00 26.69 21.92 
PAP 0.00 0.00 30.65 0.00 25.10 
CMT 0.00 116.31 104.90 0.00 87.21 
CMC 0.00 63.25 28.48 0.00 23.34 
STL 0.00 0.00 236.47 0.00 206.14 
ELC 915.17 856.44 769.59 770.94 632.17 
CST 0.00 0.00 13.34 0.00 10.93 
TRA 0.00 0.00 14.90 0.00 12.19 
Total 915.17 1036.00 1198.32 936.58 1134.01  
a Agriculture, fertilizer, equipment, other industries and service are not 
covered in ETS market in all countermeasure scenarios, so we have omitted these 
sectors in this table. 
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3.64–4.02 Bt-CO2 in 2030. Different industrial coverage will cause 
different CO2 abatement capacity, and the differences will increase as 
time goes by. For instance, CO2 reduction will be 3.90, 3.86, 3.68, 4.02, 
and 3.64 in ELC, ECC, ENINT, ENPRO, and EUETS-III scenarios, 
respectively. We found that the CO2 reduction effect will be highest 
when only energy production industries participate in ETS market, while 
the effect will be lowest when energy production industries and energy 
intensive industries are both covered into ETS market. The performance 
in ENINT scenario will be not as well as others except for EUETS-III 
scenario, which indicates that it may not be reasonable for China to 
cover energy intensive industries into ETS market and the only covered 
energy production industries may have better performance in CO2 
mitigation. The main reason may be that if only energy intensive in-
dustries are covered in ETS market, the energy consumption cost in these 
industries will increase, then the resource (carbon allowance) will be 
redistributed in these industries. However, if only energy production 
industries are covered in ETS market, the energy prices will increase, 
then the resources will be reallocated in all industries. So the CO2 
abatement performance in ENPRO scenario will be the best among these 
countermeasure scenarios. 
5.3.2. Carbon intensity 
Fig. 10 illustrates carbon emission intensity in all scenarios from 
2017 to 2030. carbon intensity is calculated by CO2 emissions divided by 
GDP, which is an indicator to measure energy efficiency or the level of 
low carbon development. ETS can reduce carbon intensity significantly: 
0.167 tons of CO2/thousand yuan in BaU scenario while 0.163 tons of 
CO2/thousand yuan in countermeasure scenarios in 2017, and the 
number will be 0.145 and 0.101–0.105 tons of CO2/thousand yuan in 
BaU scenario and countermeasure scenarios in 2030. The results are 
similar to the results of CO2 reduction. The ENPRO is the scenario with 
the lowest carbon intensity in 2030, while ENINT and ENPRO will 
emerge as the highest in 2030. The results denote that covering energy 
production industries will have better CO2 reduction efficiency. And we 
also noticed that if China’s government follows the original plan of 
coverage pattern (ECC or ENINT scenario) or phase III of EU-ETS 
(EUETS-III scenario), the reduction efficiency will not be as good as 
the one achieved by maintaining the status quo (ELC scenario). 
6. Conclusion and policy implications 
6.1. Conclusion 
This paper establishes five counter-measure scenarios with different 
coverage industries according to relevant document and experience and 
constructs a dynamic recursive computable general equilibrium model 
to answer the question on what China should do after electricity sector 
participates in the emission trading market. The following conclusions 
were obtained: 
More coverage industries in ETS market will lead to a higher GDP 
performance and less ETS price. However, ETS only covers energy 
intensive industries, so the total enterprises‘ burden will be higher than 
that in scenarios with other coverage choice. And the more industries 
are covered, the less the pressure of CO2 reduction in each coverage 
industry. The coverage of energy production sectors will directly affect 
the price increase in the energy production industry, and will indirectly 
drive the price of CO2 reduction of other companies through price fac-
tors. We found that the CO2 reduction effect will be highest when only 
energy production industries are covered into ETS market, while the 
effect will be lowest when energy production industries and energy 
intensive industries are covered into ETS market. The main reason may 
be that if only energy intensive industries are covered in the ETS market, 
the energy consumption cost in these industries will increase, then the 
resource will be redistributed in these industries. However, if only en-
ergy production industries are covered in ETS market, the energy con-
sumption cost in energy production industries will increase and the 
energy prices will increase so that the resources will be redistributed in 
all industries. So the CO2 abatement performance in ENPRO scenario 
will be the best among these countermeasure scenarios. And we also 
noticed that if China’s government follows the plan of coverage pattern 
of National Development and Reform Commission or phase III of EU- 
ETS, the emissions reduction efficiency will not be as good as main-
taining the status quo. Exports in all industries will decrease with a 
different range while ETS impact on imports is not as significant 
compared with that on export. 
We summarize several key conclusions of this paper in Table 5. The 
impacts on GDP and CO2 abatement are synchronous among different 
industrial coverage options. It shows that higher emission reductions are 
bound to higher economic costs. However, the result of carbon intensity 
shows that higher reduction efficiency is proofed in the EUETS-III sce-
nario, which is one of this paper’s implications. Carbon prices are 
negatively correlated with the number of industries covered. Total en-
terprises burden caused by ETS is not directly related to emission 
reduction. 
We notice that ENPRO scenario shows a greater performance in 
emission reduction and carbon intensity. In theory, as more industries 
are covered by carbon trading, the cost of social emission reduction will 
be lower. The emission reduction may not necessarily increase with 
wider coverage, but the carbon intensity will certainly decline.2 But why 
Fig. 9. CO2 abatement in all countermeasure scenario from 2021 to 2030.  
2 Generally speaking, emission reduction is controlled by total amount, but 
emission reduction efficiency is related to mechanism design. 
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does the result show that carbon intensity in ENPRO scenario is lower 
than that in EUETS-III scenario? The author speculates that in addition 
to the role of the carbon trading market itself, the commodity market 
plays a key role in reducing emissions. As in Fig. 5 shows, energy prices 
increase significantly in ENPRO scenario, especially the dominant en-
ergy, coal. That will encourage energy intensive enterprises to reduce 
energy use. From this point of view, carbon trading seems to be a policy 
like carbon tax policy. Is the policy more effective, and why? This worth 
considering in our next study. 
6.2. Policy implications 
According to our conclusion and the situation in China’s economy, 
energy and environmental policy, and ETS market, this paper first sug-
gests the design sector coverage should be changed, if the design re-
mains unchanged, this paper will suggest levying carbon tax as a 
supplement of ETS market:  
1) The choice of coverage industries: this paper suggests that China 
government should not follow the patterns of the National Devel-
opment and Reform Commission to cover energy intensive industries 
into ETS market. It’s better to replace them with the energy pro-
duction industries. The performance of CO2 emissions reduction 
capacity and CO2 emissions reduction efficiency in ETS market with 
energy intensive industries covered will not be as well as those with 
energy production industries covered, which indicates that it may 
not be reasonable for China to cover energy intensive industries into 
ETS market, therefore, covering only energy production industries 
may have better performance in CO2 mitigation and economy 
protection.  
2) Carbon tax as a supplement: carbon tax for energy production sectors 
can also help to balance the energy, environment, and economy in 
China if the coverage industries in China’s national ETS market are 
energy-intensive industries. Higher carbon tax and lower ETS prices 
may also be helpful to reduce CO2 emissions and protect the 
economy. 
6.3. Limitations 
In China, the first batch of coverage only includes the power gen-
eration industry. It is very difficult to separate the power generation 
industries and transmission industries in an input-output table, as we 
need to know the situation of the intermediate input. So like most pre-
vious studies this paper uses the account of electricity industry to 
represent power generation industry. 
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